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Abstract
This  paper  investigates  the  effects  of  neighborhood  on  tax  compliance  behavior  of
taxpayers based on an agent-based tax compliance model. To this aim, it is attempted to
find out different tax compliance patterns under different  “penalty rate - audit  rate”
combinations  and  for  von  Neumann  neighborhood,  Moore  neighborhood,  and  no
neighborhood schemes. The findings throw into sharp relief that both von Neumann and
Moore neighborhoods are reducing compliance behavior of taxpayers considerably. The
results of scenario runs put the case clearly.
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Introduction
Agent-based  modeling  has  proven  to  be  an  alternative  technique  in  modeling  tax
compliance behavior of taxpayers. It has been becoming more popular among the public
finance researchers as a dependable tool for simulating real life behavior of taxpayers
especially since the beginning of 2000s. A quick literature overview about the subject
can yield many papers devoted to the subject. Among them, Mittone and Patelli (2000)
that examines the effects of initial mix of taxpayers about tax evasion in the situations
of  no  audits  and  uniform auditing;  Davis  et  al. (2003)  that  investigates  the  use  of
enforcement measures by tax authority; Antunes et al. (2006) that discusses the effects
of ideas and facts on individuals; Korobow  et al. (2007) that explores the effects of
weighting neighbors payoffs on taxpayers agents; Hokamp and Pickhardt (2010) that
analyzes  evolution of  income tax  evasion;  and Bloomquist  (2011)  that  analyzes  tax
compliance behavior of taxpayers from the perspective of evolutionary dynamics are of
particular importance.
Some  of  the  well-known  agent-based  models  are  based  on  the  idea  that
taxpayers exhibit some distinct characteristic behavior and thus can be represented as
pre-defined  archetypes.  Those  archetypes  are  limited  number  of  taxpayer  profiles,
which  differ  from each  other  according  to  their  attitude  towards  tax  reporting.  For
example,  in  Mittone  and  Patelli  (2000)  taxpayers  were  classified  into  three  groups:
honests, imitatives, and perfect free riders to name all taxpayers. In Davis et al. (2003),
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only two groups of taxpayers were defined: honests, and evaders. In Bloomquist (2011)
which is also our reference paper, taxpayers were classified into four groups: defiants,
honests,  strategics and  randoms to name them all.  In that  study, a fixed amount of
agents were initiated in a two dimensional world, honoring all of these archetypes with
varying personal attributes such as income. As one might guess, parameters such as
audit rate and penalty rate were global and generally applicable for all agents.
The Agent-Based Simulation Model
We construct  an  agent-based  simulation  model  based  on  the  Small  Business  Tax
Compliance Simulator (SBTCS) described in Bloomquist (2011), an agent-based model
that simulates US small business owners’ tax reporting compliance. The SBTCS model
is  composed  of  four  taxpayer  archetypes  based  on  the  idiom that  business  owners
exhibit heterogeneous tax morale and thus compliance behavior. These archetypes are
characterized  as  defiant  agents  (i.e.  malevolent  agents  with  fully  incompliant  tax
reporting  behavior),  honest  agents  (i.e.  benevolent  agents  with  fully  compliant  tax
reporting  behavior),  strategic  agents  and  random  agents.  Strategic  agents  are
representing taxpayers who are regulating their tax compliance level according to their
prior audit experience. These agents are using a simple reinforcement “learning” by
slightly increasing their level of compliance if they are selected for an audit in previous
time period and vice versa. Random agents behave in a random manner assuming that
their behavior is a consequence of misunderstanding or misinforming of tax regulations.
Our model is basically a slightly modified version of SBTCS, having run with
real  parameters  reflecting  real  Turkish  tax  reporting  data  and  implemented  using
NetLogo 4.1.3 (Wilensky 1999) platform. Model world consists of a totaling 10,000
agents  initially  assigned  to  a  random  archetype  spread  across  100  x  100  two-
dimensional grid. 
The model strives to simulate the evolution of mean tax compliance of the
overall  population while respecting their  individual attitude toward tax reporting.  In
each  time  period,  agents  supposed  to  earn  an  amount  of  income  according  to  a
“uniform” or “lognormal” income distribution selected by the user. Moreover, agents set
their compliance level according to the attributes of the belonged archetype class. After
that,  some of  the  agents  (exact  number  is  determined  by  auditing  rate  and  related
parameters)  are  selected  for  an  audit  using  one  of  the  three  types  of  selection
methodologies. These methods include “random selection”, “DIF-like select” (a method
which tries to emulate US Internal Revenue Service’s real life audit selection procedure)
and “half-half method” which is a hybrid of these two. If there is an underreporting
detected then the agent is forced to pay both the tax and an amount of punishment
according to a predefined fine rate.
Unlike SBTCS, our model  assumes  that  whatever  the  archetype,  all  of  the
agents shift to full compliance, if (perceived or actual) audit rate is over the threshold
value. This threshold value comes from the classical model given by Allingham and
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Sandmo (1972) based on utility theory. According to the model, a taxpayer’s expected
utility from reporting x dollars of income is given by: 
E(x )=(1−p)( y−tx)α+ p[ y−ty−ϕ(ty−tx)]α  (1)
where p stands for probability of detection, i.e. audit rate,  y is annual taxable income,
ϕ  is the penalty per dollar that is not reported and,  α is the coefficient of relative
risk aversion which is 1 for risk-neutral  taxpayer. Differentiating the equation (1),  a
risk-neutral taxpayer should report zero income when p<1 /(1+ϕ)   according to the
classical  model.  In  our  model,  instead  of  reporting  0  income,  agents’  behavior
corresponds with their archetypes’ up to the threshold value.  After that value,  every
agent behaves fully compliant no matter belongs to which archetype.
The  model  implements  perceived  auditing  and  neighborhood  effect  as
described in Bloomquist (2011, 37-41). 
If enabled, perceived auditing rate is calculated according to the formula given
by Bloomquist (2011, 38):
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where using γ as a weighting parameter for actual audit rate. 
We use two neighborhood types, von Neumann and Moore neighborhoods, in
our model (as mentioned in detail in Part 3 below). Von Neumann neighborhood effect
is  implemented  as  described  in  SBTCS,  causing  freshly  created  agents  who  are
replacing bankrupted or leaving agents, to be turned into a defiant or honest taxpayer, if
there is two or more agents of that archetypes within its neighborhood and total number
of that archetypes in whole population is greater than the other ones total number in
population. If these rules do not hold, then the freshly created agents are assigned to a
random archetype class.
Moore neighborhood effect is implemented causing freshly created agents who
are  replacing  bankrupted  or  leaving  agents,  to  be  turned  into  a  defiant  or  honest
taxpayer, if there is four or more agents of that archetypes within its neighborhood and
total number of that archetypes in whole population is greater than the other ones total
number in population. If these conditions are not met, then the freshly created agents are
assigned to a random archetype class.
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The Effects of von Neumann and Moore Neighborhoods in the Context of Audit
and Penalty Rates 
Neighborhood effect is an interesting concept that deserves special attention to
arrive at a conclusion in search of tax compliance behavior of taxpayers. In that sense,
neighborhood  effect  can  be  defined  as  a  variable  that  explains  the  tendency  of  a
taxpayer to comply with tax codes -and of course, to decide paying or not paying her/his
taxes- in a certain direction based upon the relational effects of the taxpayers who are
living in the neighborhood. Although there are various types of neighborhood in related
areas of mathematics, we only used von Neumann and Moore neighborhoods as the two
most common neighborhood types in two-dimensional cellular automaton models for
testing and comparing neighborhood effects in our model. 
In cellular automaton models, a von Neumann neighborhood is defined as a
neighborhood that comprises four cells orthogonally surrounding a given cell on a two-
dimensional square lattice whereas a Moore neighborhood is defined as a neighborhood
that comprises eight cells surrounding a given cell on a two-dimensional square lattice,
as shown in Fig. 1 (a) and (b) respectively.
          (a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) A von Neumann neighborhood, (b) A Moore neighborhood.
In  tax  compliance  literature,  there  have  been  a  few studies  that  deal  with
neighborhood  effects  in  the  context  of  agent-based  modeling.  These  studies  are
Bloomquist  (2006,  2008),  Korobow  et  al. (2007),  and  Andrei  et al. (2011).  Among
them, Bloomquist (2006, 2008) represent that the larger the social network of taxpayer
agents, the greater the tax compliance rate of the society. Korobow et al. (2007) asserts
that a society behave compliant when taxpayers focus on their own individual decisions
and  the  taxpayers  remains  largely  non-compliant  in  the  presence  of  neighborhood
effects. 
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Andrei  et al. (2011) analyze tax compliance behaviors of agents by using six
different  network  structures  (as  von  Neumann  and  Moore  neighborhoods,  one-
dimensional closed ring world, Erdos-Renyi network, Small Worlds network, power law
distributed network). The findings demonstrate that taxpayers are more likely to have a
higher voluntary mean tax rate,  i.e.  higher mean compliance rate,  in  networks with
higher levels of centrality across taxpayer agents. Andrei  et al. (2011) also represents
that von Neumann neighborhood brings forth the lowest tax compliance rate although
Erdos-Renyi  network  and  Moore  neighborhood  bring  forth  the  two  highest  tax
compliance rates. 
In our study, we have strived to find different tax compliance patterns under
different “penalty rate - audit rate” combinations and for von Neumann neighborhood,
Moore neighborhood, and no neighborhood schemes. In order to accomplish this task
we have determined four key audit rates (among them, 0.023 is real audit rate of Turkey
that  is  derived  from  various  annual  reports  of  The  Presidency  of  Revenue
Administration, and a high rate of 0.20 is for controlling other rates) and three penalty
rates as given in Table 1. 
Table 1: Scenarios According to phi - p Combinations
phi (i)
Penalty: 50 % Penalty: 100 % Penalty: 150 %
p
(j)
Audit: 0.023 S11 S21 S31
Audit: 0.046 S12 S22 S32
Audit: 0.069 S13 S23 S33
Audit:  0.20 S14 S24 S34
We have run our system for 12 scenarios each one for twice, resulting in 24
runs.  The  compliance  rates  at  the  end  of  these  scenario  runs  for  three  different
neighborhood schemes are given in Table 2. Also, the three-dimensional graphs of the
first and the second simulation runs for three neighborhood schemes (by order of Moore
neighborhood, von Neumann neighborhood, and no neighborhood) are given Appendix
1  and  Appendix  2  respectively.  The  complete  trends  of  compliance  rates  for  12
scenarios both in the first run and in the second run are given graphically in Appendix 3
and Appendix 4 respectively.
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Table 2: Compliance Rates at the End of Scenario Runs
 First Runs Second Runs
S ij Moore von Neumann no neigh. Moore von Neumann no neigh.
S
1
0.189 0.182 0.398 0.154 0.211 0.394
S
12
0.120 0.136 0.433 0.136 0.156 0.427
S
13
0.165 0.150 0.470 0.150 0.137 0.461
S
14
0.094 0.125 0.530 0.090 0.132 0.530
S
21
0.186 0.197 0.398 0.177 0.213 0.395
S
22
0.124 0.143 0.425 0.140 0.156 0.426
S
23
0.131 0.170 0.462 0.127 0.163 0.466
S
24
0.150 0.133 0.533 0.157 0.172 0.528
S
31
0.166 0.243 0.397 0.159 0.238 0.401
S
32
0.150 0.169 0.428 0.143 0.156 0.425
S
33
0.149 0.157 0.465 0.151 0.148 0.459
S
34
0.170 0.185 0.530 0.154 0.145 0.530
With these runs, we have arrived at some interesting results on tax compliance
behavior  of  taxpayers.  Firstly,  it  is  very  clear  that,  without  a  neighborhood,  tax
compliance  rates  of  taxpayers  are  high  enough.  As  shown  on  Table  1  above,  tax
compliance rates range from a minimum of 0.394 up to a maximum of 0.533 in the first
and second runs. These results mean that both von Neumann and Moore neighborhoods
are reducing compliance behavior of taxpayers considerably.
When we take penalty rate constant, it is seen that audit rate affects compliance
rate  inversely  proportional.  However,  without  a  neighborhood  effect  this  situation
occurs in direct contradiction. In other words, when penalty rate is taken constant mean
compliance  rate  responds  to  increases  in  audit  rate  as  expected.  It  means  that
neighborhood effect has negative influence on tax compliance behavior of taxpayers.
That is to say, density of audit in low penalty rate is not important but increases in audit
rate are effective together with high penalty rate. The results of either runs put the case
clearly.
Theoretically, it is generally accepted that a desirable tax compliance rate can
be reached through fine tunings in some variables such as audit rate, and penalty rate.
However, neighborhood effect  may invalidate this situation. Moreover, this situation
may change according  to  type  of  neighborhood.  In  this  paper,  for  example,  Moore
neighborhood yield worse compliance rate than von Neumann neighborhood. This is
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because Moore neighborhood is a surrounding that more agents affect one another. This
result is expected result for this study.
Figure 2: Screen Capture of a Scenario Interface with von Neumann Neighborhood
Figure 3: Screen Capture of a Scenario Interface with Moore Neighborhood
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Conclusion
In this study, we have arrived at some noteworthy results on tax compliance behavior of
taxpayers  using  agent-based  strategy  simulation.  At  first,  it  is  become  evident  that
without a neighborhood, tax compliance rates of taxpayers are high enough. In other
words, both von Neumann and Moore neighborhoods are reducing compliance behavior
of taxpayers considerably. Namely, density of audit in low penalty rate is not important
but increases in audit rate are effective together with high penalty rate. The results of
two runs put the case clearly.
Additionally, it is easily seen that neighborhood effect may invalidate policies
of tax administration, which based on the idea that the expected tax compliance rate can
be achieved through adjustments in some variables such as audit rate, and penalty rate.
Besides,  it  is  understood  that  types  of  neighborhood  may  affect  the  degree  of
invalidation  of  tax policies.  For  example,  the  two runs of  the  scenarios  reveal  that
Moore neighborhood result in worse compliance rate than von Neumann neighborhood
due to comprising more agents interacting with each other.
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